United Nations, Population Division, 2010 Revision of World Population Prospects: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm (consulted in September 2012). Unless otherwise stated, the data used in this article are from the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations in New York.
Jacques Vallin, “Faut-il une politique de population?” Population et Sociétés 489 (May 2012).Demographic transition is the passage from a regime of high fertility and high mortality, almost in equilibrium, to a regime of?low fertility and low mortality, again almost in equilibrium. During this process, population growth accelerates because of the initial decline in mortality, which is followed, generally after a certain time gap, by a fall in fertility.
International migrants (people living in a country other than that of their birth) today represent about 3% of the global population; see John F. May, World Population Policies: Their Origin, Evolution, and Impact (New York: Springer, 2012), 33.
May, World Population Policies, 1-2. May, World Population Policies, 60. May, World Population Policies, 156.These had already been confirmed at the 1968 Tehran Conference (see May, World Population Policies, 109).
Today, it is estimated that 222 million women do?not have access to family-planning services. This is the reason for organizing the London Summit in July 2012, at the instigation of the British Department for International Development and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, whose goal was to mobilize new funding.
In 1995 the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, the influence of which was similar to that of the Cairo Conference.
May, World Population Policies, 99-105.On the whole, family planning programs helped to reduce fertility by a pro-portion that is estimated, depending on the country, at between 0.5 and 1.5 chil-dren per woman (interna-tional empirical data).
The rapid demographic transformation of South Korea has been interpreted by some experts as an “educational” transition, with improvements in the levels of secondary and tertiary education having led to?changes in couples’ behavior.
See United Nations, World Population Policies 2009 (New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2010).
Jean-Pierre Guengant and John F. May, “L’Afrique subsaharienne dans la démographie mondiale,” Études (October 2011): 305-316.
Guengant and May, “L’Afrique subsaharienne,” 311-312.Thomas W. Merrick, “Population and Poverty: New Views on an Old Controversy,” International Family Planning Perspectives 28, no. 1 (2002): 41-46.
Among Islamic countries, Iran has experienced a dramatic fall in fertility, which has gone from seven to fewer than two children per woman between 1984 and 2006, that is, in only twenty-two years; it is the most rapid fall in fertility ever recorded. See May, World Population Policies, 134.
Philippe Collomb, Une Voie étroite pour la sécurité alimentaire d’ici à?2050 (Rome/Paris: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) & Economica, 1999).
John F. May, “Population Policy,” in Handbook of Population, eds. Dudley L. Poston and Michael Micklin (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publisher Springer Science & Business Media, Inc., 2005), 848-849.
1A lthough the global population reached the milestone of seven billion on October 31, 2011, and should increase again by three billion by the end of the end of the century (average United Nations projection), [1] many experts believe that population growth no longer merits the primary attention it was given in the past. They point out the need to train human capital (education and health), to fight poverty, and to reduce inequalities. They also cite a series of other issues that are more important in their eyes than population growth (or its decline in some countries), namely environmental protection, global warming, repeated food crises, excessive and polluting consumption by the industrialized countries, as well as the fight against the HIV/Aids epidemic.
2This intellectual attitude is partly inspired by the success of population policies put in place between 1960 and 1980, at that time in the form of family-planning programs (in 1960 the global population was three billion people). These programs, combined with other socioeconomic advances (women’s education as well as their access to paid employment), accelerated the decline in fertility and slowed demographic growth in developing countries. Unfortunately some of these interventions were authoritarian, even abusive. This was the case in India with episodes of forced sterilizations during the period known as the Emergency from 1975-1977. As for China, in 1979 it adopted a very harsh policy known as the one-child policy, which is still in force today despite many exceptions. These serious infringements of individual freedom provided additional arguments for opponents of any intervention on population and, especially, fertility. These developments also led some demographers to doubt the legitimacy of population policies while, moreover, questioning their effectiveness. [2]
3However, strong population growth will continue, even if some countries experience a decline in their population. Between now and the end of the century, the planet will have to accommodate a number of people equivalent to more than 40% of its current population. Nowadays there are also new demographic challenges. These are the high fertility rates that persist in the poorest countries (most of the forty-eight countries called “least developed”), the low fertility rate and sometimes depopulation in several industrialized countries (in Europe) and even in some emerging countries (in Asia), and, especially, changes in the age structure following the demographic transition process. [3] These changes in the age pyramids have economic consequences, known as the “demographic dividend.” This occurs when the fall in fertility causes the base of the pyramid to stabilize, or even shrink, which has the dual effect of increasing the number of working people, in relative terms, and reducing the burden of children that is borne by workers. As well as all these dimensions, we can add those of rapid urbanization and the growth of slums, particularly in the major countries of South Asia and Africa. Finally, international migratory flows will also probably escalate in the next few decades. [4]
4This article is aimed in particular at recalling the historic role of population policies, and emphasizing the importance of new demographic issues, which will require new government responses. The article remains at the level of population policies and does not offer a moral reflection, which is the responsibility of authorities other than that of the demographer. Nevertheless, knowledge of population policies is an essential precondition for this moral reflection.
5Population policies can be defined as actions taken explicitly or implicitly by the authorities to predict, delay, or manage imbalances between demographic changes, on the one hand, and social, economic, environmental, and political objectives on the other. [5] They are implemented by means of “political levers,” namely the instruments or points of entry used to obtain the changes desired. These instruments are access to information, laws and regulations, taxation, subsidies and investments, and finally the direct provision of services. [6] For example, vaccination programs are accompanied by information campaigns, the vaccines are imported with no customs duties, and the services are subsidized by the authorities.
6First and foremost, governments are responsible for implementing population policies, sometimes entrusting specific interventions to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private associations. In some countries, these have led directly to policy changes; this was the case in Latin America. Moreover a network of international organizations, as well as NGOs, assisted developing countries in formulating and implementing their population policies. This assistance was financial and technical. In developing or industrialized countries, however, policies have most often taken the form of socioeconomic regulations (family allowance, healthcare, pension funds) that were supposed to correct or sometimes just support demographic changes. Finally, all policies on population or socioeconomic regulation always have the ultimate objective of acquiring public goods, that is, tending towards the common good.
7Following the Second World War, interventions by colonial powers in developing countries were aimed at reducing the high levels of mortality, particularly among infants and children. Besides vaccination campaigns and the fight against major endemics (for example, malaria), governments have worked to supply drinking water and sanitation. The authorities have also tried to improve nutrition levels. These advances in public health and improvements in living conditions helped to rapidly reduce mortality. In turn, this decrease led to an acceleration in population growth, which was particularly apparent in Asia, which was already the most populous region in the world in the 1960s. This situation, unprecedented in the history of humankind, led governments and international organizations to turn to the problem of high demographic growth and, this time, to consider implementing programs specifically aimed at reducing high fertility.
8The pioneering countries in this field were Japan and India. In Japan, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the leaders passed a law in 1948 known as eugenic protection, which helped to accelerate the transition in fertility. India was the first major country to officially implement a national population policy, adopted in 1952, whose stated aim was to reduce fertility by making access to family-planning services easier. However, the results of this policy were slow to appear, hence the abuses already mentioned. Egypt was also concerned about its population issue beginning in the 1950s, but only set up an organized program to reduce fertility twenty-five or thirty years later. As well as family planning, a few countries tried other responses to population growth. Thus Indonesia, with the support of the World Bank, launched a redistribution of the population, which resulted in the displacement of about three million people from Java to different islands of the archipelago between 1974 and 1994. However, this policy of transmigration only absorbed 15% of Java’s population growth. [7]
9It should be emphasized that these policies focused on fertility did not succeed everywhere. In this regard, the comparison of Pakistan and Bangladesh is enlightening. A program of medicalized family planning failed in Pakistan, even though the population there was relatively more educated. In Bangladesh (which was part of Pakistan until 1971), a more innovative program with a strategy of door-to-door visits produced good results, even though the socioeconomic situation was a priori more unfavorable. The emphasis initially placed solely on family planning gradually gave way to a much broader approach of human development, favoring socioeconomic advances and the primacy of women’s education. Moreover, the rise in influence of feminist ideas and rejection of the abuses which several governments were guilty of led international stakeholders (NGOs, activists, pressure groups) to emphasize individual rights. [8]
10These two developments, that is, taking greater account of human development and an increased respect for human rights, merged in 1994 at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in what is known as the Cairo Agenda, namely the promotion of “reproductive health.” This agenda was not well defined, its priorities were not clear, and it was undoubtedly too ambitious. It was not fully implemented, partly because of the lack of funding, both at the national and international level. [9]
11For their part, industrialized countries faced the challenges of low fertility (below 2.1 children per woman, the level of generational replacement), an aging population, and international migration. In these countries, policies aimed at increasing fertility have had modest results. Although, on the whole, policies to increase the birth rate have succeeded in increasing fertility at the margin, they have not led to a dramatic increase in the number of births. France may be an exception: this country, which has followed a fairly consistent probirth policy for almost a century now, has a fertility rate (two children per woman) that is among the highest in the European area. Policies to manage an aging population have also only produced a few tangible results and attempts to raise the retirement age have often come up against open hostility. Finally, with regard to immigration, a distinction should be made between countries that are traditionally open to immigrants (the United States, Canada, and Australia), those with a less strong tradition of welcome (most European countries), and those closed to immigration (Japan). Migratory policies generally helped to attract immigrants but had little success in making them return to their country of origin. Nor did these policies prevent the phenomenon of illegal immigration. The regularization of those who are “undocumented” remains a controversial subject in the political life of many industrialized countries, as can be seen nowadays in the United States.
12Since the 1970s, demographic questions have become a true international issue thanks to the United Nations organizing major conferences on this subject. The first of these meetings took place in Bucharest in 1974. It opposed neo-Malthusians, who supported intervention on fertility, and developmentalists, who supported socioeconomic advances alone to reduce fertility. Socioeconomic development eventually reduces fertility, but the “time” variable (in other words the acceleration of population growth in the short term) sometimes requires targeted interventions regarding fertility.
13The Bucharest conference was followed ten years later by the conference in Mexico, this time marked by a complete reversal by the United States, which maintained that the demographic factor was neutral for socioeconomic development and promoted the market economy as a key element for progress. The last major meeting devoted to demographic questions was the already-mentioned Cairo ICPD. This meeting was relatively more consensual than previous conferences, despite the opposition of some traditionalist and religious forces. It should be emphasized that the commitments made during these conferences, often adopted in a climate of optimism, are not always followed by tangible effects in the countries themselves. We saw this with the Cairo Agenda, whose implementation, we could say, left a lot to be desired, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. [10]
14Around the same time, new institutions were created, aimed at promoting family planning or dealing more generally with questions relating to population. [11] In 1952, the year India adopted the first population policy, a group of eight national associations created the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), whose headquarters is in London and which is based on 172 national associations. A series of other institutions were established slightly later; these were either bilateral, like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the American International Development Cooperation Agency, set up in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, or multilateral, like the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), created in 1969. Finally, we must not forget the crucial role played by the major American foundations, such as the Population Council or the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. Today, the Bill and Melinda Gates and William and Flora Hewlett foundations are the leaders in this field.
15The spread of family planning was promoted by concerted efforts at the international level that were disseminated by a series of specialized national organizations. The Population Movement played a leading role in this regard. Mainly funded by American foundations, this movement facilitated what was called the “contraceptive revolution.” This “revolution” was promoted either by government efforts (in the case of Asia), or by those of NGOs and private associations (in the case of Latin America). In developing countries, fertility, estimated at six children per woman in 1960, fell to fewer than three children per woman forty years later. [12] Of course, women’s education and their entry into work which followed or accompanied the fall in fertility are also factors that played an important role. [13] We should also note the influence of changes in perception and attitude compared with traditional family norms. These are “ideational” changes, or the diffusion of new ideas, often fueled by word of mouth as well as reinforced by the media (the case of novelas or soap operas televised in Brazil).
16Finally, since 1945, enormous efforts, both national and international, have been made with regard to the collection of population data. These efforts have helped to improve the measurement of population growth. Population censuses became more regular (every ten years). Consequently, extensive programs of demographic surveys (most often every five years) were also established. The largest is that of demographic and health surveys, funded by the United States and still in progress. Simultaneously, the United Nations Population Division has launched a series of surveys with governments to find out about their perceptions concerning changes in their population and, in particular, their population policies. [14] Finally, the increased availability of population projections, facilitated by the arrival of information technology, was also a decisive element in governments’ awareness of demographic issues. In this context, the United National Population Division prepares biennial demographic projections, which are authoritative. Furthermore, every year the same organization convenes the Commission on Population and Development (created in 1946) in New York, which analyzes a different theme every time.
17While most countries in the world are about to end their process of demographic transition, the least developed countries are still experiencing high fertility levels – of at least four children per woman with the exception of some countries, including Bangladesh, which has already mentioned. These “least developed” countries represent about 16% of the global population and will experience strong demographic growth, which the countries will have to deal with, particularly in Africa, and more especially in ecologically fragile areas such as the Sahel. [15] About 38% of the global population lives in countries where fertility is between 4 and 2.1 children per woman (the replacement level). These countries should continue their demographic transition, while ensuring that inequalities between the different sections of the population are reduced, as well as those between men and women. Finally, 46% of the global population lives in countries where fertility is today below the replacement level. These countries have to deal with problems of subfertility and an aging population, even of depopulation, sometimes in conjunction with the crucial question of major immigration flows.
18The United Nations predicts that the global population could reach 10.1 billion inhabitants at the end of the century, if fertility reaches about two children per woman in 2095-2100: this is the average assumed projection already mentioned. However, a variation of half a point in this predicted fertility level, up or down, would give very different results in 2100. Thus a final fertility rate of 2.5 children per woman would lead to a global population of 15.8 billion inhabitants in 2100! Conversely, a fertility rate of 1.5 children per woman would see the global population stabilize at about 6.2 billion inhabitants in 2100, after a peak of 8.1 billion people around 2045.
19This illustrates the crucial importance of fertility rates for future global demographic developments. In addition, the demographic developments of tomorrow are occurring now, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. [16] A delay of just a few years in the transition in fertility will result in a substantial increase in the population these countries will reach in the future. This is largely caused by the phenomenon of the momentum of the population, namely a surplus of population growth caused by a very young age structure (in other words, there are so many young people who are old enough to be married that the population will continue to increase even if fertility declines).
20Conversely, another series of issues arises when fertility no longer reaches the replacement level, particularly when fertility is at levels that are barely above one child per woman (this is the situation in several European countries and some Asian countries or geographical entities, including South Korea and Taiwan). These countries are facing depopulation, in other words, as well as aging; their population is also declining in number. They are, therefore, sometimes forced to accommodate more immigrants, whose integration can prove to be all the more difficult since the host population is less numerous, less dynamic, and is aging rapidly.
21These new demographic issues are emerging in an international context that has also changed significantly in the last two decades. First of all, the question of climate change and environmental protection returns with increasing persistence on the international scene, even if the demographic aspects are not sufficiently highlighted. The sudden rise in grain prices, for example, is partly linked to global warming, but it is also caused by substantial population growth, as well as the appearance of mass biofuel production and the desire of people in emerging countries to consume more animal proteins (the animals most often being fed with grain). Then the joint issues of poverty and inequality also mobilize the international community. These problems have a demographic dimension as well. The relationship between high fertility and poverty is now established, at least at the level of households. [17] A new branch of population studies is also interested in the question of security and its links with demographic trends in countries that have not yet completed their transition. What was known as the Arab Spring clearly has a demographic aspect because of the often huge proportion (more than 40%) of young people between the age of fifteen and twenty-four among adults aged fifteen or above. These young people, most of whom have a certain level of education, demand jobs and a better future. [18] Moreover, half the world’s population lives in urban areas, the definition of which varies, however, from country to country. In 2050, two-thirds of people will be city dwellers. This phenomenon is unfortunately accompanied by a growth in slums in major cities in developing countries, which will urgently require real urbanization policies.
22Finally, modern technologies, for example ultrasound antenatal examination, also pose new and formidable dilemmas. This inexpensive technology makes it easier to choose the sex of children, but unfortunately it too often leads to selective abortions of girl fetuses. This produces serious statistical distortions in the balance between boys and girls. China, for example, already has to cope with tens of millions of young men who have little hope of being able to marry and start a family.
23Explicit or implicit population policies will largely determine the future demographic development of human societies. The acquisition of public goods and the degree to which objectives to reduce poverty and inequalities are achieved will depend on the results of these policies. Likewise, global food security (and consequently malnutrition levels) will also depend on the success of population policies, as half the targeted objectives are linked to future fertility levels. [19] Finally, achieving the “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs), adopted in 2000 and most of which contribute towards results in terms of population, or which depend on these, is also closely linked to the effectiveness of population policies or their absence.
24It appears that the main challenge for these policies in the twenty-first century will be to link interventions in the area of population to the new issues of economic and human development. These are reducing poverty, promoting fairness, the rollout of secondary and tertiary education, controlling the HIV/Aids epidemic, satisfying the needs of the young, preventing conflicts and violence, and preserving the balance between population and environment. In industrialized countries, it is a question of securing the global sustainability of socioeconomic gains made. However, in developing countries and especially in the least developed countries, the objective is above all to allow the most destitute to break with the spiral of poverty.
25To meet all these challenges, new population policies should take account of five essential priorities. [20] First of all, there should be the broadest possible consensus on the options chosen in terms of population policies. Then, the new policies should be organized around a few basic themes, such as human development, the reduction in inequalities, the fight against poverty, and intergenerational transfers. Policies should also be much more inclusive and take greater account of the wishes of individuals themselves. Moreover, new and more reliable data should be collected, particularly on international migration. Finally, policies should also consider the results of scientific research, which is constantly shifting, thanks to the collection of new data. Four groups of people will require particular attention in these new polices, namely women, teenagers, the elderly, and migrants, with the latter too often ignored.
26Population policies contribute to achieving global objectives, but they are not a goal in themselves. However, governments sometimes believe that they can leave population questions to one side and achieve their socioeconomic development objectives by other means (for example, via educating women alone). They often feel that it is difficult to deal with demographic questions head on because of human rights, cultural and religious barriers, or political consequences. Nevertheless, there will always be a need for population policies because one cannot ignore demographic issues. It seems, then, that, far from being overtaken, population policies are more important and more necessary than ever.